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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Due process as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is very flex-
ible, and can be enlarged or contracted according to the policy of the
Supreme Court at a given time. Confessions cannot always be tested to
fit a Procrustean bed, but must be measured in the light of a flexible due
process requirement that state courts observe that fundamental fairness
essential to the protection of the accused by refusing to use a confession
obtained by physical or psychological coercion. It is to be hoped that
we are not entering upon "a new regime of constitutional law, '5 2 in
which the rights of the accused are valued less highly than is the efficient
functioning of the machinery for the administration of justice, but rather
that a resilient Due Process Clause will reassert in succeeding cases the
principles that nearly a generation of decisions has evolved.
JAmEs ALBERT HousE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Racial Restrictive Covenants-Recovery of
Damages for Breach
Since 1948 when the Supreme Court held that racial restrictive
covenants could not be specifically enforced by injunction in state or
federal courts,1 legal writers have speculated2 and the courts have dis-
agreed3 on the recovery of damages. Now the Supreme Court in Bar-
rows v. Jackso 4 has settled the issue by holding the award of damages
by a state court for the breach of racial restrictive covenants to be state
sions under the Due Process Clause, but also facing the same problem are thosejurisdictions in which the voluntariness of the confession is a question of law for
the court. The latter must decide whether a conviction now must be reversed when
the trial judge admits a confession which may have been involuntary, but there is,
however, other sufficient evidence on which the jury could have found the accused
guilty. And just how much coercion the Supreme Court is now likely to say is of
"such gravity and magnitude" to require a reversal is an unknown measure and a
problem facing all jurisdictions.
" Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1102 (1953) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
' Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) (state courts) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U. S. 24 (1948) (federal courts) (discussed in Notes, 27 N. C. L. REV. 224 (1949),
28 N. C. L. REv. 442 [1950]).
"Barnett, Race Restrictive Covenants Restricted, 28 OR. L. REV. 1 (1948)
Crooks, The Racial Covenant Cases, 37 GFo. L. J. 514 (1949) ; Groves, Judicial
Interpretation of the Holdings of the United States Supreme Court in the Restric-
tive Covenant Cases, 45 ILL. L. REV. 614 (1950); Heard, Race and Residence:
The Current Status of Racial Restrictive Covenants, 1 BAYLOR L. Rav. 20 (1948) ;
Howell, Recent Developments in the Law of Racial Restrictions on Real Property,
1 INTRA L. REv. OF ST. Louis 222 (1951) ; Kiang, Judicial Enforcement of Re-
strictive Covenants in the United States, 24 WAsH. L. REV. 1 (1949) ; Lowe, Racial
Restrictive Covenants, 1 ALA. L. REv. 15 (1948) ; Ming, Racial Restrictions and
the Fourteenth Amendment: the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. OF CHi. L. Ray.
203 (1949) ; Scanlan, Race Restrictions in Real Estate-Property Values v. Hunan
Values, 24 NoTRE DAIE LAW. 157 (1948).
See notes 10 and 11 infra.
'73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. (Adv. p. 961) (1953).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it deprives
racial minorities of the equal protection of the laws. 5
The principal case involved an agreement between adjoining land
owners in Los Angeles, each of whom covenanted that no part of his
real property should "be used or occupied by any person or persons not
wholly of the white or Caucasian race." 6  Upon the sale by defendant
to a non-Caucasian in 1950, plaintiffs instituted an action at law for
damages against the seller. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County
sustained defendant's demurrer to the complaint. On appeal to the
District Court of Appeal, it was held that
a state may not by judicial process enforce private rights
derived from consensual agreements of private individuals, where
to do so would result in the infringement of civil liberties guar-
anteed by the Constitution of the United States;
therefore the demurrer was properly sustained.7 In interpreting and
extending the rule of the Shelley case, the California Court further
stated: "The coercive device of retribution in the form of damages is as
effective as the coercive effect of injunctive relief, although not as im-
mediate."8
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held:
(1) A state court in awarding damages for breach of a racial
restrictive covenant is taking state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment, and is acting in violation of the equal
protection clause.
(2) A person defending the breach of a racial restrictive covenant
may rely on the denial of constitutional rights of a racial
minority group, although no member of the group is before
the court.9
Until the Shelley case, it was assumed that damages could be recovered for the
breach of racial restrictive covenants. Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E.
496 (1930).
'Barrows v. Jackson, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1032 (1953).
Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, _ 247 P. 2d 99, 103 (1952). The
Supreme Court of California denied petition for hearing on October 2, 1952. The
California decision in the Barrows case is discussed in Notes, 38 CORNELL L. Q.
236 (1953), 4 HASTINGs L. J. 57 (1952), 37 MINN. L. Ray. 65 (1952), 25 RoCKY
MT. L. Rav. 112 (1952), 26 Sou. CALJF. L. REv. 201 (1953), 26 TEmPLE L. Q. 320(1953).
' Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P. 2d 99, 112 (1952).
'The late Mr. Chief Justice Vinson dissented on this point, saying in part: "The
majority identifies no non-Caucasian who has been injured or could be injured if
damages are assessed against respondent for breaching the promise which she
willingly and voluntarily made to petitioners .... Because I cannot see how re-
spondent can avail herself of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of total strangers-
the only rights which she has chosen to assert-and since I cannot see how the
Court can find that those rights would be impaired in this particular case by re-
quiring respondent to pay petitioners for the injury which she recognizes she has
brought upon them, I am unwilling to join the Court in today's decision." Barrows
v. Jackson, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1038, 1041 (1953).
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(3) The refusal of a state court to enforce such covenants does
not violate the constitutional guaranty against impairing the
obligation of a contract, because that guaranty is only directed
against legislative action.
(4) Plaintiffs are not themselves denied due process and equal
protection by a refusal to enforce the covenants, because no
one can demand state action which would result in a denial
of equal protection of the laws to other individuals.
Before Barrows v. Jackson and after Shelley v. Kraemer, four courts
had dealt with the problem of awarding damages in this type case; two
granted damages' 0 and two denied recovery." Clearly, as a result of
the Barrows decision, state courts and probably federal courts cannot
enforce racial restrictive covenants in any form of action.12  The cove-
nants themselves have not been held to be invalid; rather they are merely
unenforceable in the courts. 13 However, this 'decision does not preclude
a later holding that racial restrictive covenants are void because opposed
to the express public policy of the United States as set forth in the Civil
Rights Act 14 and in the Charter of the United Nations.1' The courts
have thus far either rejected'0 or ignored17 contentions that the cove-
1" Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P. 2d 1017 (1949) (where damages were
granted in a suit against the original covenantor, an intermediate vendor, and the
non-Caucasian vendee for a conspiracy to violate the covenant) ; Weiss v. Laeon,
359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W. 2d 127 (1949). These decisions were criticized in Notes,
3 ALA. L. REv. 379 (1951), 4 ALA. L. REv. 289 (1952), 63 HARV. L. Rnv. 1062(1950), 28 N. C. L. REv. 442 (1950), 13 U. PITrSBURGH L. REv. 647 (1952), 24
RocKY MT. L. Rav. 380 (1952), 38 VA. L. REv. 389 (1952).
"' Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D. C. D. C. 1950) ; Phillips v. Naff, 332
Mich. 389, 52 N. W. 2d 158 (1952).
- These cases on the Fourteenth Amendment apply to all minority groups, al-
though the cases have usually arisen in suits by Negroes. Amer v. Superior Court
of California, 334 U. S. 813 (1948) ; Yin Kim v. Superior Court of California 334
U. S. 813 (1948) ; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 33 (1905).
" Barrows v. Jackson, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1033 (1953).
1414 STAT. 27 (1866), 8 U. S. C. § 42 (1946).
1 CHARTR OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Arts. 55"(c), 56 (1945).
The High Court of Ontario in Re Drummond Wren held racial restrictive
covenants were void because opposed to Canadian public policy. In ascertaining
that public policy, the court relied on the CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS and
the Atlantic Charter as well as Canadian Statutes. 4 D. L. R. 674 (1945) 0. R.
778. However a later decision by the Supreme Court of Canada ignored these pub-
lic policy considerations and held the covenants invalid as illegal restraints on
alienation. Re Noble and Wolf, 1 D. L. R. 321 (1951) S. C. R. 64 (discussed in
Comment, 29 CAN. BAR. Rav. 969 [1951]). Similarly, a California Court held that
restrictions under the Alien Land Law were invalid under the CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS; but on appeal, the Supreme Court of California held that the
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER was not self-executing and would not supercede incon-
sistent local laws, but that the restrictions violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fujii v. State. 97 Cal. App. 154, 217 P. 2d 481 (1950), aff'd on other grounds, 38
Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).
13 Judge Edgerton of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vigorously
asserted that the covenants should be void in his dissenting opinion in Hurd v.
Hodge, 162 F. 2d 233, 235-246 (1947). But although the Supreme Court reversed




nants are void as opposed to public policy, but it is possible that the
decision in the segregation cases now pending before the Supreme Court
will strengthen public policy against racial discrimination.
The Shelley case stated that acts of the executive and legislative
branches of state governments are as much state action as are judicial
acts.18 The recognition and enforcement of discriminatory zoning ordi-
nances, passed and administered by county and municipal officials, has
been held to be unconstitutional state action.19 Whether the Barrows
case can be construed to bar purely administrative acts tending to effec-
tuate racial restrictions, such as the recordation of deeds containing dis-
criminatory covenants, is uncertain. The covenants are by recordation
given official recognition, which tacitly implies that state government
officials condone discriminatory practices, although they cannot posi-
tively enforce them. A possible analogy in reverse can be 'drawn be-
tween the function performed by a county registrar of deeds and that of
a county registrar for voting. The Supreme Court in the latter situa-
tion has held that a refusal to register qualified Negroes is state action
forbidden by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 20  It would
appear that the language in the Shelley case is broad enough to preclude
the acts of administrative officers,2 1 should such acts be challenged on
the ground that they are acts of the state.
Yet so long as the covenants remain only "gentlemen's agreements"
and are not brought into court, they can under the Barrows decision
continue to flourish. The Court in Barrows v. Jackson very clearly
retained the principle established in Corrigan v. Buckley22 and restated
in Shelley v. Kraemer that "so long as the purposes of those agreements
are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear
clear that there has been no action by the state and the provisions of the
Amendment have not been violated."
23
However, the purposes of the covenants can (and undoubtedly will)
be effectuated by extra-legal means. One of the most effective methods
of discouraging prospective purchasers who are "undesirable" is by
"visits" from a neighborhood committee, which suggests that another
residential area might be found more congenial.2 4 In addition to social
18 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 14 (1948).
1" Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S. 704 (1930) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S.
60 (1917) ; Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119, 6 S. E. 2d 867 (1940).
.o Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1943) ; Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp. 442
(1952); Dean v. Thomas, 93 F. Supp. 129 (1950).
" "The action of state courts and of judicial officers il; their official capacities
[italics added] is to be regarded as action of the state within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 14 (1948).
22 271 U. S. 323 (1926). 23 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948).
"' For a description of some methods of social ostracism against Negroes who
move into white neighborhoods, and a catalogue of extra-legal devices used, see 14
PoPuLAR GovERNMENT (No. 6) 8, 11 (June 1948) (Institute of Government, Chapel
Hill, N. C.) ; Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. CHi. L.
REv. 1, 21-28 (1948).
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pressure, the refusal of real estate agents even to show Negroes houses
in restricted residential areas, and the disinclination of banks to furnish
loans for such purchases will serve to retain the effect of the restrictions
for a long time to come.25 Other devices are the use of cash deposits,
neighborhood clubs or corporations, options to repurchase, land trusts,
and long-term leases.2 6  Only time, education, and the gradual disap-
pearance of emotional prejudices can bring to an end these devices.
LINDSAY TATE
Contracts-Inducing Breach-Intentional Interference with
Contractual Relations-Justification-Privilege
Plaintiff, a contract carrier, alleged that he had contracted with
various persons to carry them to and from Camp Lejeune, and that
defendant induced these named persons to break their contracts with
plaintiff and ride on defendant's bus instead. In sustaining an order
overruling a demurrer to this cause of action, the court affirmed the
general principle that a party may be held liable in damages for inducing
another to breach his contract.'
The principle of tort liability for inducing breach of contract is rela-
tively new. The first significant case, Lundey v. Gye 2 held that the
defendant's inducement of a famous singer to breach her contract to sing
at plaintiff's theater was actionable. 3 The principle was first recognized
in North Carolina in Haskins v. Royster4 where the defendant induced
a servant of plaintiff to breach his employment contract with the plain-
tiff,5 and was affirmed and extended in Jones v. StanlyO where the de-
" Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate, 24 NoTmE DAME LAW. 157, 179
(1949).2 These are discussed in detail by Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 16 U. CHl. L. REv. 203, 216-221 (1949) ; Scanlan, Racial Restrictions
in Real Estate, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 147, 179-181 (1952) ; Notes, 1 INTRA L. REV.
(U. C. L. A.) 14, 16-18 (1952), 27 N. C. L. REv. 224, 229-234 (1949), 13 U. Pirrs-
BURGH L. 1Ev. 646, 661-665 (1952).
It seems obvious that some of the means formerly employed are now outlawed
by the Barrows decision. Declaratory judgments and advisory opinions by state
courts would be state action in violation of the Constitution. Also the inclusion of
racial restrictions as conditions in a fee simple determinable or a conditional fee is
probably now illegal, at least so far as enforcement is concerned. The effect of the
Barrows decision should be kept in mind when reading the articles cited throughout
this note.
Bryant v. Barber, 237 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 2d 410 (1953).
(1853) 2 Ell. & BI. 216.
'The chief significance of this case being a holding that the action would lie
even though the means used were not tortious to the singer, which had long been
a requisite. (Italics supplied.) See: Garret v. Taylor, (1621) Cro. Jac. (K. B.)
567.
'70 N. C. 601 (1874).
It is said that rights to the performance of a contract are property rights.
Second National Bank v. M. Samuel and Sons, 12 F. 2d 963 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Kock
v. Burgess, 167 Iowa 727, 149 N. W. 858 (1914) ; Winston v. Lumber Co., 227 N. C.
339, 42 S. E. 2d 218 (1947).0 76 N. C. 355 (1877).
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